A friend and colleague of mine, Bruce Weinstein, raised a provocative question, tapping the expertise and sounding the sentiments of his many Facebook friends:
"What do you think of "Live Honorably" as my proposed slogan? I'd use it
as a way to let people know how they would benefit from my talks,
training, books, and consultations."
It sparked a conversation revealing -- and reflective of -- quite a few different viewpoints on the relationship between honor and ethics. He also proposed that I weigh in on the matter, so that's precisely what I intend to do here.
An occasional digest of interesting issues pertaining to, or illuminated by, Virtue Ethics - reflections on classic texts and thinkers of the Virtue Ethics traditions - and more general discussions of matters in Ethics
Showing posts with label traditions of moral enquiry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label traditions of moral enquiry. Show all posts
Sep 18, 2014
Oct 5, 2013
Are the Virtues Already In Us?
In my Ethics classes, one type of assessment and exercise I routinely require my students to engage in is what I call an Application Assignment. I provide them with a complex, morally ambiguous, problematic scenario, which they then have to analyze along various lines. I'll write more about those parameters in a follow-up post, and discuss just how the assignments work to foster student learning at several different levels. For now, what I'd like to focus on is one very interesting, common, and revealing mistake I see some students make semester after semester.
A key component of the assignment is competently applying three of the moral theories we've been studying to the case in question. This requires that the students do a bit of explaining about the key concepts of the theory, and then go on to particularize these to the characters of the narrative. Students do all right with Egoism, with the authoritarian Might-Makes-Right theory, and often enough with Utilitarianism. Many of them run into problems with Virtue Ethics, and there are a variety of distinct misunderstandings and misapplications. I'm particularly interested in one recurring way students get matters wrong. Some students interpret Virtue Ethics as asserting that the virtues lie within each and every person, ready to be used when situations call for them.
A key component of the assignment is competently applying three of the moral theories we've been studying to the case in question. This requires that the students do a bit of explaining about the key concepts of the theory, and then go on to particularize these to the characters of the narrative. Students do all right with Egoism, with the authoritarian Might-Makes-Right theory, and often enough with Utilitarianism. Many of them run into problems with Virtue Ethics, and there are a variety of distinct misunderstandings and misapplications. I'm particularly interested in one recurring way students get matters wrong. Some students interpret Virtue Ethics as asserting that the virtues lie within each and every person, ready to be used when situations call for them.
Aug 10, 2012
Weeds in the Garden of Moral Life
When I returned, about a week and half ago, from my summer travels, a restorative period of reconnecting face to face with friends and family, it was no surprise to find the little garden I'd cleared and planted with herbs, strawberries, and peppers , now covered over with weeds, invaded and seemingly conquered at every available inch of dirt. After all, I basically abandoned the planted plot not only to the elements of sun, rain, wind, but also to encroachments by other plants seeded within the soil, imperfectly rooted out previously, or straying past the border of bricks. Given the garden's diminutive scale, thoroughly weeding it anew was thankfully just a matter of an afternoon's effort -- but careful, attentive work, for the weeds had been allowed to grow, as is their wont, not only over, not only within, but intertwined with the other plants.
Culling crabgrass, bugle-weed, and other invasive species out from patches of strawberry, thyme, or rosemary, demands a gardener's eye, discerning patterns of leaf, stalk, and shoot from each other, and hands that follow, gently, teasingly until the moment for pulling, separating out the good from the bad, the desirable from that which desires to choke and supplant it. As the hours passed, more and more soil cleared of green, except for the plants originally intended for those spots, similitudes between gardening, the husbandry of soil and seed, and the processes of moral life, practice, development suggested themselves to me, tangibly, tactilely, experimentally, as much as in concept and language. Gardening -- like related activities of landclearing and trailblazing, berry-picking and foraging, finding and transplanting plants -- can easily turn into merely utilitarian, practical activity, but it also just as much admits room, and conduces to a readiness, for contemplation.
Culling crabgrass, bugle-weed, and other invasive species out from patches of strawberry, thyme, or rosemary, demands a gardener's eye, discerning patterns of leaf, stalk, and shoot from each other, and hands that follow, gently, teasingly until the moment for pulling, separating out the good from the bad, the desirable from that which desires to choke and supplant it. As the hours passed, more and more soil cleared of green, except for the plants originally intended for those spots, similitudes between gardening, the husbandry of soil and seed, and the processes of moral life, practice, development suggested themselves to me, tangibly, tactilely, experimentally, as much as in concept and language. Gardening -- like related activities of landclearing and trailblazing, berry-picking and foraging, finding and transplanting plants -- can easily turn into merely utilitarian, practical activity, but it also just as much admits room, and conduces to a readiness, for contemplation.
Mar 8, 2012
Teaching (Virtue) Ethics: Goods and Practical Reasoning
In an earlier post, I provided a peek into some of the introductory materials I provide my face-to-face or online students currently taking Ethics classes with me through Marist College. This is the really basic, cover-in-the-first-week kind of stuff, but one of the things I like most about the discipline and the texts of Ethics is that you can keep going back to these key distinctions, concepts, objects and experiences -- because moral life is, after all rooted in the rest of our lives, and provides, you might say, the dimension without which that life would be less than human, impoverished in intelligibility, lacking a certain depth of meaning.
To push the metaphor -- which like other analogies will of course eventually exhibit its disappointing limits -- of dimension and depth, I suggest that Ethics or Moral Theory ( a great deal of which gets done outside of academic philosophy, by the way) provides the third dimension to what would otherwise be only two-dimensional, flat, restricted by its own planarity. That not to say that everything needs to have and exhibit -- even have tacked upon it -- such a dimension of depth. some things, like blueprints, are perfectly fine in two dimensions. Paintings, photographs, even cartoons, though -- don't they possess the illusion of depth? Yes -- by relying on a transfer from experienced depth and perspective -- which they don't posses but which they can mimetically evoke or represent precisely because of our experiences of that dimension in other settings. Studying Ethics explicitly, deliberately, systematically, means devoting sustained attention -- alas for all too short an apprenticeship -- to the contours, the concealments, the criteria, even in some cases the charlatanry of those who work and warp and weft in this vital dimension of human experience.
To push the metaphor -- which like other analogies will of course eventually exhibit its disappointing limits -- of dimension and depth, I suggest that Ethics or Moral Theory ( a great deal of which gets done outside of academic philosophy, by the way) provides the third dimension to what would otherwise be only two-dimensional, flat, restricted by its own planarity. That not to say that everything needs to have and exhibit -- even have tacked upon it -- such a dimension of depth. some things, like blueprints, are perfectly fine in two dimensions. Paintings, photographs, even cartoons, though -- don't they possess the illusion of depth? Yes -- by relying on a transfer from experienced depth and perspective -- which they don't posses but which they can mimetically evoke or represent precisely because of our experiences of that dimension in other settings. Studying Ethics explicitly, deliberately, systematically, means devoting sustained attention -- alas for all too short an apprenticeship -- to the contours, the concealments, the criteria, even in some cases the charlatanry of those who work and warp and weft in this vital dimension of human experience.
Mar 3, 2012
Teaching (Virtue) Ethics: Goods and Values
Last semester, I started teaching Ethics classes for Marist College, and continued it this semester, even picking up an online Ethics class as well, which started in earnest today. I have to say that, after three years at my previous position confined to teaching mainly just slews of Critical Thinking sections, occasionally punctuated with an "upper-level" (even Intro to Philosophy was dubiously granted that title) class, if it made enrollment -- tough to do with no actual major in Philosophy -- where one of the older profs had staked out Ethics as "her" class, it's really refreshing to be teaching and designing Ethics courses again.
My teaching career actually began more than a decade ago with Ethics, and it was a staple course for me at every other place I taught besides FSU -- a big state university, a small community college, an extension campus, a struggling 4-year liberal arts college, a prison degree program. At one time, I worried about being confined to the "Ethics Ghetto" -- not getting to teach what, at the time, seemed more interesting and exotic courses, where I'd have interested philosophy majors rather than students struggling through a required course. Now, my outlook is very different. There's nothing like being sent down yet further to make one appreciate what one previously took for granted -- but at FSU, I finally grasped the importance of teaching non-majors in core Philosophy classes, and also incidentally learned how to do it fairly well.
My teaching career actually began more than a decade ago with Ethics, and it was a staple course for me at every other place I taught besides FSU -- a big state university, a small community college, an extension campus, a struggling 4-year liberal arts college, a prison degree program. At one time, I worried about being confined to the "Ethics Ghetto" -- not getting to teach what, at the time, seemed more interesting and exotic courses, where I'd have interested philosophy majors rather than students struggling through a required course. Now, my outlook is very different. There's nothing like being sent down yet further to make one appreciate what one previously took for granted -- but at FSU, I finally grasped the importance of teaching non-majors in core Philosophy classes, and also incidentally learned how to do it fairly well.
Sep 30, 2011
Big Think: Chess Life, or Why Getting Beaten Can Be Good
In a recent interview with the Big Think, chess-player Maurice Ashley,
celebrated as the first African-American grandmaster, briefly narrates
his development in the game of chess, from novice to master. His
recollections and reflections are interesting from a Virtue Ethics
perspective for several reasons.
The game of Chess is in fact one the very practices examined by contemporary virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre in his seminal book After Virtue. He didn’t pick chess by chance or whim — chess does in certain ways exemplify the sort of practices that bear important and educative analogies to traditions of moral inquiry, like those of Virtue Ethics. A practice, in the way MacIntyre famously reconfigures the term, denotes:
The game of Chess is in fact one the very practices examined by contemporary virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre in his seminal book After Virtue. He didn’t pick chess by chance or whim — chess does in certain ways exemplify the sort of practices that bear important and educative analogies to traditions of moral inquiry, like those of Virtue Ethics. A practice, in the way MacIntyre famously reconfigures the term, denotes:
Sep 9, 2011
This Field Required: Poverty and Virtue Ethics
Here’s an interesting blog posting by Pamela Stubbart,
exploring the implications of a concept that’s being talked about quite
a bit in psychology and some in ethics: will-power depletion. The general idea is that each human being has, at any given time, a
certain amount of willpower — capacity to stick to or follow through on a
difficult decision or action, also, in the older ethical literature,
known as “self-control” — on reserve, and it can be exhausted as it gets
used over time making decisions.
There have been some empirical psychological studies, which seem to indicate — you should always be rather skeptical of “studies show… ” until you’ve looked carefully at how the study was carried out and what reasoning the researchers employed — that there is something to this idea of “willpower depletion.” And, this in turn has some implications for those in poverty:
There have been some empirical psychological studies, which seem to indicate — you should always be rather skeptical of “studies show… ” until you’ve looked carefully at how the study was carried out and what reasoning the researchers employed — that there is something to this idea of “willpower depletion.” And, this in turn has some implications for those in poverty:
the less money you have, the more situations you will encounter in which you must restrain yourself and make difficult purchasing tradeoffs, and this means you’ll have less willpower leftover later to deal with other situations in which you might need it
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